Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it causes turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disruptions in the delivery of public services. Most research on …
The political appointment of bureaucrats is typically seen as a rent-seeking strategy that helps politicians sustain clientelistic networks and manipulate public administration to their advantage. I argue that political appointments can also increase …
A vast literature has studied political cycles in economic outcomes and economic policy tools (political business and political budget cycles, respectively). I identify a related phenomenon - electoral cycles in the hiring and firing of bureaucrats …
Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations …
This article examines the enfranchisement of noncitizens and seeks to explain governments' decisions about whether to include or exclude them from the vote. By focusing on the incentives behind incumbents' decisions, the article argues that …