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Can anti-corruption policies curb political budget cycles? Evidence from public employment in Brazil

A vast literature on political cycles has shown that politicians often manipulate policy tools ahead of elections to win votes. Yet much less is known about the effects of policies designed to constrain these cycles. I argue that legal constraints on …

Turnover: How lame-duck governments disrupt the bureaucracy and service delivery before leaving office

Electoral accountability is fundamental to representative democracy. Yet, it can also be costly for governance because it generates turnover among bureaucrats (not just politicians) and disrupts the delivery of public services. Previous studies on …

Information, oversight, and compliance: A field experiment on horizontal accountability in Brazil

Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations …

Franchise reforms in the age of migration: Why do governments enfranchise noncitizens?

This article examines the enfranchisement of noncitizens and seeks to explain governments' decisions about whether to include or exclude them from the vote. By focusing on the incentives behind incumbents' decisions, the article argues that …